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VAN AUTHOR MEETS HER CRITICS
Around The Mind Possessed: The Cognition of Spirit Possession 
in an Afro-Brazilian Religious Tradition by Emma Cohen.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, ix + 241 pages.
 Comments by Diana Espirito Santo
“Why spirits?” asks Emma Cohen (97)—why are concepts of intentional and agentive su-
pernatural beings such as spirits and gods so prevalent cross-culturally? What makes them 
appealing, contagious, and lasting? And what kinds of assumptions about the world and its 
workings do they entail and do they generate? In Th e Mind Possessed, Cohen off ers us some 
answers; to some degree by appealing to her ethnography of the Afro-Brazilian practice of 
batuque in the Amazon-bordering town of Belém, but mostly by subordinating particular-
istic concerns to what she considers more general ‘scientifi c’ ones. However, it may be the 
questions, rather than the answers, that merit revising. 
Cohen holds that the minds of human beings are constrained by certain tacit (and largely 
unconscious) assumptions about the natural and social world, inherited from our evolu-
tionary past (‘naive biology’, for instance; or, more important in this case, ‘theory of mind’, 
consistent with the modularity thesis). Following authors such as Barrett (1999, 2004), Boyer 
(1994, 2001), and Sperber (1996), she argues that the spirit beliefs that are likely to be trans-
mitted from one person to the next generally consist of a balance of intuitive (the spirit has 
thoughts and feelings) and counterintuitive principles (the spirit has a mind but no body). 
Furthermore, spirits (such as orixás) are catchy ideas because they are socially relevant—they 
are believed to have access to crucial ‘strategic information’, and this keeps people coming 
back. Possession, Cohen explains, is an interpretation of what can be regarded as a relatively 
normal ‘alternative state of consciousness’, one based on the over-attribution of agency, both 
from the perspective of the possessed and from that of his or her audience (“subtle contextual 
cues and psychological biases come into play” on both ends [131]).
Comparatively little attention is given to the structure and experience of possession, or to 
how it is properly learned and developed over time, which strikes this reader as paradoxical 
given the author’s concern with explaining the continued existence of these phenomena. By 
disembedding the conceptual from the phenomenological, Cohen ends up not being able to 
say much about the ‘cognition’ leading up to and of spirit possession itself, ‘on the ground’ 
(as she oft en says), which is a historical, intersubjective process, some aspects of which are 
shared and others unique to each person. In other words, because she separates so determi-
nately native explanations from the so-called objective ones, Cohen is unable to transform 
ethnographic categories into vital analytical ones, permitting a rather one-sided conversation 
to take place. Th at the former kinds of explanations are relegated to the status of ‘beliefs’—by 
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defi nition implicitly lesser kinds of ‘truths’—with which no real ontological dialogue is pos-
sible, reads like a justifi cation of this authoritative stance. Further, by squeezing her data to fi t 
to the universal models of spirit ‘beliefs’ that she defends, my suspicion is that Cohen glosses 
over potentially important ethnographic details relating to local understandings of matter, 
spirit, and personhood; ‘nuances’ that could compromise some of her main assertions, includ-
ing the fact that what is appealing to the evolved psyche about possession is that it provides 
spirits with their missing part—physicality (Cohen says nothing about other dimensions of 
spirit ‘materialization’ in the lives of her informants). Finally, in chapter 4, Cohen’s frank 
irritation with overly descriptive ethnographies (which eschew the ‘scientifi c method’ and 
which she attributes to the “dominant agenda of anthropological scholarship, in which the 
sole mandate of epistemological relativism produces a situation in which anything goes”[73]) 
is founded on an alarmingly circular defi nition of what counts as legitimate anthropological 
knowledge and theorization. On closer inspection the so-called relativists share a great deal 
more with those who defend the cognitivization of the anthropology of religion than certain 
of the latter authors might be willing to admit: both conceptually colonize the ‘other’ by rede-
fi ning and redeeming ‘otherness’ (see Argyrou, 2002), that is beliefs in spirits.
But it is not Cohen’s analysis that registers as particularly objectionable. In fact, it follows 
well from the central claim of the cognitivists: namely, that culture is transmitted from one 
mind to another, thus the job of anthropology consists in uncovering the mental mecha-
nisms whereby some ‘bits’ of culture are more likely to be successful (i.e., memorable) than 
others. Sperber (1996) has called this task “an epidemiology of representations”, and Cohen’s 
book is testament to the viral catchiness of his thesis, especially in its alluring suggestion 
that a scientifi c explanation of religious phenomena (“true materialism” [101]) is not only 
possible but also explanatory. Cohen does a fi ne job in wedding the existing neurological 
and psychological data with the ethnographic facts she selectively expounds. But the book 
inevitably reads a little too much like a ‘just so’ story throughout. And this is because there 
is something distinctly unsettling about the presumption that possession behavior/experi-
ence is primarily about the acquisition of concepts. Rather Cohen should make a clearer 
diff erentiation between her informants’ real-time and a posteriori rationalizations of spirit 
possession, which might be predominantly conceptual, and their actual know-how, which 
would require acknowledging that inferential knowledge is not just conceptual but embod-
ied. Basing one’s conclusions on the innate ‘attractiveness’ of certain ideas seems at the very 
least like a wasted opportunity to properly explore a complex and multidimensional fi eld of 
religious transmission.
Few anthropologists or psychologists would defend the idea that the human mind is com-
pletely devoid of some inference systems whose continued existence has been facilitated by 
their adaptive value, with language as a case in point (Karmiloff -Smith 1999). But it is an en-
tirely diff erent thing to suggest that a pre-existent ‘design’ or mental architecture (in advance 
of its development) underwrites all learning and knowledge (Ingold 2001: 125). Indeed, it is 
very unlikely that cultural knowledge is adequately described in propositional form, as many 
authors have successfully demonstrated (e.g., Clark 1997; Hutchins 1995; Lave 1988). Rather, 
their evidence points to the importance of sensory and motor participation in the develop-
ment of perception and skill, and to an understanding of cognition in which the ‘cognitive’ 
cannot conceivably be reduced to mental operations alone. All of this matters because in 
eff ectively reproducing views of the minds such as that of Tooby and Cosmides and the ‘in-
teractionist’ research paradigms they foster—“Th e rich complexity of each individual is pro-
duced by a cognitive architecture, embodied in a physiological system, which interacts with 
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the social and non-social world that surrounds it” (1992: 21, quoted on p. 96; italics added)—
Cohen denies herself the chance to produce an original cognitive ethnography with what can 
only be fabulous data on the indissociability of psychology, physiology, and cosmology. 
  Diana Espirito Santo is postdoctoral research fellow in Social Anthropology at the Insti-
tute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon, and at the Museu Nacional (Brazil). She 
has worked on themes of self and knowledge in Cuban spirit mediumship practices and is 
currently developing a project on Afro-Brazilian Umbanda in Rio de Janeiro; gimmefi sh@
yahoo.com.
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 Comments by Arnaud Halloy
In Th e Mind Possessed, Emma Cohen lays the foundations of a naturalist approach to spirit 
possession. Her project is an ambitious one: “to present generalizable accounts of the emer-
gence, form, and spread of recurrent, widespread features of possession phenomena” (61). By 
providing a “synthesized explanatory account of spirit possession and mediumship” (96), able 
to integrate ethnographic material with fi ndings from cognitive sciences, she aims to identify 
and describe “certain mechanisms of cognition” that contribute to “the particular form and 
incidence of possession among a group of Afro-Brazilian cult participants in Belém” (97) in 
the north of Brazil. 
Aft er introducing the reader to the history and ethnographic setting of the Afro-Brazilian 
cult Culto Afro (chapters 2 and 3), Cohen off ers an overview of the divergent interpretations 
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of possession in anthropology (chapter 4), but also in disciplines as diverse as medicine, neu-
rology, and sociology (chapter 5). She highlights the necessity to go beyond ‘impressionistic 
speculations’ and theoretical reductions in the explanation of possession, which is sometimes 
described as mere pathology (as in some medical approaches), as a neurological or psycho-
chemical mechanism (the Calcium Defi ciency Hypothesis) or as the simple product of ‘so-
ciological forces’. I focus my review on the subsequent chapters in which she presents and 
develops her hypotheses pertaining to the mental mechanisms that account for the success of 
possession phenomenon around the world. 
A fi rst set of hypotheses concerns the cognitive structures underlying the conceptualiza-
tion of spirits (chapter 6). Very sketchily, Cohen argues that human beings are natural Carte-
sians (see also Bloom 2004). Th is intuitive understanding of mind/body interaction is what 
supports the possibility of what she calls ‘mind migration’, the core conceptual framework of 
possession phenomenon. Drawing on Pascal Boyer’s (2001) theory of religious representa-
tions, Cohen defends the idea that spirits—because they are part of the ontological category 
of ‘persons’—generate a rich set of intuitive inferences regarding their nature. Because, in 
the case of possession, they are able to migrate from one body to another, spirits fall into 
the category of ‘minimally counterintuitive’ concepts. Th is cognitive feature is what makes 
spirit possession a cognitively attractive phenomenon, facilitating its memorization and 
transmission. 
In chapter 7, in my view the most innovative but also the most controversial one, Cohen 
analyzes the way people actually perceive possession during possession episodes. Her main 
hypothesis is that the perception of possession brings two potentially confl icting cognitive 
devices into play. On the one hand, ‘theologically correct’ discourse (Barrett 2004) about 
possession depicts a mutual infl uence between the possessed and the spirit. She calls this the 
fusion principle. On the other hand, “whatever the case may be, at any moment, there is only 
one intentional agency represented—one mind and not two—as operating within the body, 
to which outward behaviors are attributable” (139); this is what she calls the displacement 
principle. According to Cohen, the ‘displacement principle’ should be considered the default 
cognitive mechanism at work in possession, precisely because it is sustained by largely intui-
tive assumptions; the fusion principle is described as an a posteriori and refl exive interpreta-
tion that is only relevant when the principle of displacement “no longer helps one to make 
sense of a situation” (145). 
In chapter 8, Cohen aims to identify the cognitive mechanisms that explain the tight link 
among the presence of spirits, possession phenomena, and misfortune. Her conclusions tend 
to reinforce classical (functionalist and intellectualist) interpretations of affl  ictive possession 
and witchcraft , in which both are seen as the result of a social causality: many ambiguous 
events, most of the time unhappy and personally signifi cant, are perceived as the result of a 
supernatural intentionality, itself colored by strong moral intuitions about why such events 
happen. Within such a theoretical framework, possession and the communication it estab-
lishes are understood as helping to predict and control the circumstances of recurring mis-
fortune. According to Cohen, a good cognitive candidate for explaining why supernatural 
agents are so oft en involved in the causal explanation of misfortune is the “Hypersensitive 
Agency Detection Device” (Barrett 2004), characterized by a tendency to overestimate the 
attribution of agency to events in the environment. 
I want to make two critical comments in connection with this work. Th e fi rst is ethno-
graphic and draws on my own research in a quite similar Afro-Brazilian cult, the Xangô cult 
of Recife, in the northeast of Brazil. It pertains to Cohen’s model of personhood and suggests 
an alternative framework to her analysis of the perception of possession. I wonder about the 
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relevance of positing an “intuitive sense of incongruence … about the indivisibility of per-
sonhood” in a cultural context in which simultaneous possession of the same deity by many 
initiates is the rule rather than the exception, and where the self is conceived as intrinsically 
multiple (Segato 1995), that is, as a crossroad or ‘stage’ where various entities (orixás, ori, a 
spiritual entity corresponding to the person’s spirit or destiny) may express themselves in 
various ways (through possession, but also on the levels of personality, preferences, and phys-
iology). A related question concerns the respective cognitive weight given to the ‘displace-
ment’ and ‘fusion’ principles in the perception of possession behavior. My claim would be the 
opposite of the one Cohen proposes: the displacement principle in the Xangô cult refl ects a 
‘theologically correct’ discourse, describing an ideal trance state involving unconsciousness 
and the full control of the possessed by the possessing spirit, while the fusion principle—
characterized by the perception of a mutual interaction between the possessed and the spirit 
or deity—is a constitutive cognitive mechanism of possession perception. Some fi rst-hand 
ethnographic data support these ideas.
First, possession is not an on/off , monolithic phenomenon, but rather a continuum of 
psycho-biological changes that vary from slight emotional arousal to the ideal possession 
state. Cult members are experts in discriminating the relevant behavioral and emotional cues 
that indicate the intensity of trancing and the immediate stages whereby mediumship is de-
veloped. Mixed intentionalities are what is actually perceived in all cases where there is no 
‘full presence’ of the deity or spirit. Second, perception of possession behavior may change 
according to cultural ideas and representations about possession, including not only con-
cepts about what possession is, but also ideas about how it is learned, how the spirit ‘gets 
close’ (se aproxima) to the possessed body, how the spirit is held to interact with his or her 
‘child’ during possession episodes, and so on. First trance episodes, for example, sometimes 
look like a fi ght between the novice and his or her deity, in which he or she might start crying 
or become panic-stricken, making wild and uncoordinated movements, and so on. Th ird, 
Xangô members recognize at least two categories of possession: ‘unconscious possession’, 
which corresponds to the ideal possession such as that described in Cohen’s displacement 
principle, and ‘conscious possession’, in which possessed people say, for example, that “they 
know that they are talking, but don’t know what they say.” Finally, it should be noted that 
possession involves a much more complex ‘mind-reading’ system than ordinary interaction. 
Possession behavior is ritualized and theatrical, providing distinct expectations about the 
respective role of actions, perceptions, intentions, and emotions in the observed behavior. 
Such “pragmatic preconditions of participation” (Houseman 2003) are determining factors 
in the kind of intentional and communicative interplay that is taking place between co-pres-
ent agencies.
My second criticism is theoretical and applies to much cognitively oriented research in 
anthropology. Emma Cohen focuses almost exclusively on how people think about posses-
sion. However, if one wishes to take into account the process of possession, that is, how spirit 
possession is learned and how possessed/spirit interaction evolves over time, such an overly 
‘representational’ conception of cognition is prejudicial. Maybe more than any other social 
phenomena, possession is lived through aff ects and percepts which, along with the concep-
tions of possession Cohen rightly identifi es, are good candidates for explaining its wide suc-
cess around the world (Halloy 2009). Pragmatic conditions of possession phenomenon such 
as the form of ritual language, relational patterns, spatial work, objects, images, substances 
and body manipulation, are also crucial in determining the way people think about, feel, per-
ceive, and interact with possessed people. In substance, the question cognitive anthropology 
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should pay more attention to is not just how intuitive thinking constrains cultural practice, 
but also how cultural practice may (deeply) transform intuitive thinking. 
  Arnaud Halloy is an associate professor at the University of Nice (Laboratoire d’Anthro-
pologie et de Sociologie Mémoire Identité et Cognition Sociale). His research focuses on 
the role of emotion and cognition in religious transmission, with a special interest in ritual 
practice and possession phenomena. He has conducted extensive fi eldwork on Afro-Brazil-
ian cults in Brazil and Belgium; halloy@unice.fr.
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 Comments by Pierre Liénard
Mind-boggling! 
Emma Cohen communicates her thoughts beautifully! Her writing transports us seam-
lessly from elating, moist, tropical borders to no-less-exciting, but somewhat drier (and less 
torrid), theoretical climes. Cohen’s seminal idea of treating possession as a window into or-
dinary functional aspects of our cognition is tantalizing. We already knew that the study of 
nonordinary cognition observable in mental illnesses and other psychological and psychiat-
ric disorders does tell us a whole lot about human ‘normal’ cognition. Cohen’s decision to fo-
cus on altered states of consciousness in an Afro-Brazilian religious tradition and on some of 
the explicit representations systematically associated with that—should I dare—mind-bog-
gling phenomenon is original and ingenious. Furthermore, an essential plus to me, the whole 
endeavor is a resolute attempt to sail away from the too-oft -navigated Derridean-hermeneu-
tical-sophistic-cum-postmodernist waters. It is not an overstatement to claim that the study 
partakes of one of the powerful impetuses that have been driving anthropology’s scientifi c 
revival for the past decades.
I was so enthralled by the material presented that I felt somewhat frustrated. Th at is, I 
wanted more details than the inherent limitations tied to the format of a book allowed Cohen 
to add. I am thrilled to be given the opportunity to interact indirectly with the author through 
this review-response process and hence to facilitate the publication of more signifi cant data. 
Cohen has noted (36) that race, as a biological category, does not come up oft en as having 
much signifi cance when it comes to membership in an Afro-Brazilian cult. One becomes 
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Afro when one becomes an initiated member of a terreiro (i.e., a community of Afro-Brazil-
ian cult members) regardless of one’s obvious ethnic affi  liation. Knowing how important 
in Brazil skin color (and all its recognized subtle variations of shade and hues) are for the 
defi nition of an individual’s identity (see the extensive lexicalization of those diff erences), I 
am a bit surprised that it would be the case that race as an observable category focusing on 
ethnic features (e.g., hair, skin) would be so easily relegated to oblivion. Is it true that racial 
information is irrelevant to the members of the Afro-Brazilian cult? Probably the ‘offi  cial’ 
discourse does maintain that, but I am wondering whether racial identity does not creep 
back up into more implicit representations in the minds of the participants to the cult. What 
is the ratio between black and white pais (i.e., leaders of the religious community)? Is there 
any evidence that people might be essentializing racial origin as an indicator of a privileged 
access to the cult? If we look at the proclaimed genealogy of power transmission between 
masters and novices, do we fi nd an over-representation of reference to black leaders? Are we 
indeed in a situation of a fundamental rejection of any racial category? Do people appraise 
black and white pais the same way? Th e well-known fact that South American Amerindian 
pajes (medicine men) are treated as essentially diff erent (usually as more powerful and the 
source of new magico-religious materials) from non-Amerindian medicine men seems to 
suggest that probably the treatment of the racial category in the Afro-Brazilian cult could 
well be slightly more complicated than Cohen’s claims let us believe.
At several places in her work, Cohen tackles an essential problem that has fueled much de-
bate in the literature on possession: the possession’s true or fake nature and good or bad qual-
ity as appraised by observers and participants to the cult. Cohen does great work in analyzing 
the fl agrant discrepancies between participants’ explicit statements about individual posses-
sions and their beliefs that the hosts are indeed possessed. Knowledge of the hosts’ usual 
behaviors and attitudes outside of the realm of possession seem to ‘contaminate’ observers’ 
appraisal of the hosts’ possessions (see, e.g., 148–49). Something seems to be missing in that 
superb analysis of people’s appraisal of possession: A systematic inquiry into people’s criteria 
of appraisal. I was craving for more ethnographic details! How do people go about judging? 
What do they take into consideration? Are there any identifi able templates that ease people’s 
decisions about the nature of the possession? A couple of actual examples would have been 
appropriate. Descriptions of actual possessions (involving or not involving an identical entity) 
with the specifi c reactions and judgments of observers would have provided some essential 
information for the study of the phenomenon. Th is leads me to my main critique. Th e book is 
missing a good detailed description of a ‘typical’ possession (or of the diff erent types of pos-
session as Cohen alludes to when talking of pai’s various possession/trance-like episodes). It 
would also have been very helpful to have some sort of description of the major entities and 
of their typical ways of manifesting themselves as described by ‘knowledgeable’ people, then 
to compare that to what happens in actual possessions. Do we see an evocation of the typical 
offi  cial templates of manifestation or do we see systematic departures from the norm? 
Finally, Cohen alludes to a very important debate in the study of religion. What is the 
evolutionary role of notions of supernatural agents—as gods, supernatural entities, and other 
spirits have come to be known in the literature—in enhancing genetic fi tness? Th ough bring-
ing into the same explanation a proponent of a by-product hypothesis and two proponents of 
an adaptationist view, Cohen does not clearly address the matter.
  Pierre Liénard is an assistant professor at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. He con-
ducts research among the Turkana herders of Kenya. His research focuses on coalitional, 
precaution, and ritual psychology; pierre.lienard@unlv.edu.
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 Response to Comments by Emma Cohen
In Th e Mind Possessed, I sought to explain the incidence and spread of a range of ideas and 
practices associated with spirit possession phenomena. I argued that new cognitive scientifi c 
perspectives on how human minds work are important for answering old anthropological 
questions concerning human cultural recurrence and variability. Why are some ideas and 
practices highly recurrent and stable across variable social, cultural, historical, or environ-
mental contexts, while so many other possible ideas and practices never even arise? Why do 
some cultural phenomena enjoy relatively eff ortless success in transmission—that is, in gen-
eration, acquisition, communication, and memory—while others remain localized, are easily 
corrupted, or swift ly retreat back into oblivion? What are the mechanisms that stem and 
abet the transmission of culture, and how do they work? Drawing on my own ethnographic 
research in Brazil and the descriptive accounts of many others, I attempted to generate and 
substantiate a series of hypotheses and proposals concerning the spread and appeal of ideas 
about spirits, possession, and healing. 
Although thoroughly interdisciplinary, the book was written primarily with an anthro-
pological audience in mind. It is therefore a great privilege to receive the careful and criti-
cal commentaries of three anthropologists who are eminently qualifi ed to assess the book’s 
strengths and weaknesses. I thank the editors of this journal for the opportunity to respond to 
these comments. I sincerely hope that this will not be ‘the last word’, but rather an invitation 
to continue a discussion that includes a wider audience and that, most important, stimulates 
constructive and valuable debate on theoretical and methodological issues of broad signifi -
cance to our discipline. Many of the tentative hypotheses put forward in the book may garner 
little empirical support, may be replaced with alternatives, or may be forgotten. My hope is 
that this will not compromise a more general ambition that motivated my work—to stimulate 
and contribute to the advancement of the data-driven generation, systematic testing, and 
broad reinstatement of explanatory theory within sociocultural anthropology. I believe that 
we can one day present some reasonably confi dent answers to the questions posed above. To 
this end, I prioritize them in the book. It is also to this end that, in the current absence of the 
vast amount of data required to privilege any particular answers, I remain skeptical of the 
partial, provisional, tentative accounts I have provided.
My three critics’ assessments of the general project vary widely—from ‘original and inge-
nious’ to ‘stimulating’, to ‘a wasted opportunity’; the questions need revising, the answers need 
revising, the answers need enriching with more data. Despite the disparities, there is much I 
agree with. I recognize that there are dimensions of possession phenomena, relevant to the 
overall questions, that I have not paid suffi  cient attention to in both theory and description. 
I am grateful to my critics for their detailed comments, some of which incorporate relevant 
ethnographic data and analysis, and I attempt to address the doubts and queries expressed. 
Th ere are some more general objections to the project, however, that I wish to consider fi rst. 
Th ese objections strike less at the specifi c details of any claims and more at the foundations 
upon which these claims were constructed. Because of their potentially far-reaching impor-
tance for conducting a cognitive science of culture (or indeed the science of human behavior 
more generally), and because they appear to echo a general cynicism regarding explanatory 
theorizing in anthropology that I endeavor to critically address in my book, I prioritize these 
broad areas of potential disagreement. 
At the outset of her critique, Diana Espirito Santo suggests that the questions I set myself, 
rather than the answers, need revising. With respect, I remain a little baffl  ed by this proposal, 
not least because I failed to fi nd an example of a single question to which Espirito Santo 
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objects. Indeed, the critique proceeds to focus on the answers, broadly concluding that the 
analysis is not “particularly objectionable,” but that it fails to “properly explore a complex 
and multi-dimensional fi eld.” Th is is not the place for a comprehensive defense of the general 
questions that motivated my research, whether in terms of anthropological pedigree, timeli-
ness, precedent, or some other more or less agreed-upon set of criteria. It may be useful, how-
ever, to at least clarify the broad aims of the research, and provide some general background, 
before assessing how and in what ways my endeavors may have failed or otherwise.
Th e project started from the observation (for which I do not take credit) that not all hu-
man cultural phenomena are equivalently and evenly spread across all human populations. 
Some ideas, for example, are more widespread than others; some are more persistent, stable, 
and ancient than others; some reliably arise considerably earlier in human child development 
than others. Some spring up like stubborn weeds with little or no explicit encouragement, 
while others fail to take root even in the most favorable of environmental conditions. 
In answer to the obvious question of why this lack of parity exists, some anthropologists 
have proposed that the unique structures of evolved human cognitive architecture may be, in 
part, responsible (see, e.g., Sperber and Hirschfeld 1999). Just as there are constraints on the 
cognitive skills and motivations of fi sh, birds, dogs, and chimpanzees, so too are human men-
tal, and thus behavioral, phenomena powerfully modulated by the workings and aff ordances 
of human cognitive mechanisms. If this were not the case, we would fail to be impressed by 
anomalous cognitive abilities some individuals have to encode and recall the contents of a 
phone book from as little as an instantaneous glance, or the practiced expertise of the world’s 
champion chess masters, or indeed the unique perspectives through which people with au-
tism view their social worlds—simply put, in the absence of cognitive constraints, such quali-
ties would not be anomalous. 
Th e broad claim, then, is that the structures that permit culture also constrain it—they 
do not support the generation, acquisition, and storage of every idea equally. Insofar as this 
is correct, we should expect to see patterned variation in human cognitive outputs (ideas, 
beliefs, etc.), and these patterns should be explainable, in part, in terms of how cognitive 
structures work. 
How cognitive structures work is by no means a settled question. Nevertheless, over half 
a century of experimental and observational investigation within the cognitive sciences has 
generated some remarkable discoveries, and an increasing number of anthropologists are 
enthused by the possibility of developing the above broad claims into researchable ques-
tions and testable hypotheses. In Th e Mind Possessed, I take up this challenge, drawing from 
ethnographic data on possession phenomena as well as relevant advances in developmental 
and cognitive psychology to both raise and answer questions about cultural variability and 
recurrence. 
I was not concerned with what counts as “legitimate anthropological knowledge” or with 
what possession (however it is demarcated and defi ned) is primarily about. I do not set out 
to determinately separate ‘native’ and ‘scientifi c’ explanations. I agree with Espirito Santo and 
others that it is unlikely that all human thoughts, knowledge, and motivations are readily 
revealed in propositional statements elicited by direct questioning techniques. It is precisely 
for this reason that I see such promise in the methodologies developed within the cognitive 
sciences that probe out-of-awareness attitudes, inferences, heuristics, and biases. Contrary to 
Espirito Santo’s suspicion, I am least of all motivated to conceal recalcitrant, nonconforming 
nuances and details under a thick, imperious gloss, or to squeeze, press, or cajole data to fi t 
models. I was chiefl y concerned with answering questions that arose out of my fi eldwork 
experiences and my review of the broader literature—questions such as why certain ideas 
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about what happens when someone is possessed by a spirit are particularly widespread; why 
people appear to acquire and use Th eological Idea A when they are explicitly taught that 
alternative Th eological Idea B is the correct one to adopt and use; why it occurs to people 
that misfortune does not just happen according to random coincidence; why they seek out 
special kinds of agents—spirits and deities—to diagnose and heal illnesses, and under what 
conditions and in what populations certain ideas about spirits, possession, and healing are 
likely to fl ourish. 
Possession, however it is defi ned, is complex and multifaceted. By focusing on the ques-
tions above, I have ignored potentially many others. By exploring the infl uence of certain 
cognitive constraints, I have not done full justifi cation to the entire causal complex. As I ar-
gue at length in the book, the growing literature on how minds work is a fruitful place to look 
for at least partial answers to this particular set of challenging questions and problems. Turn-
ing tentative answers into testable hypotheses, and devising methods for their substantiation, 
are much tougher tasks. Although I believe I barely got started along this road, Espirito Santo 
summarizes the result as reading “a little too much like a ‘just so’ story throughout.” For every 
apparent ‘just-so’ generated by this theory-building exercise, there is (or there should be) a 
‘not-so’ against which it may be tested. Testing between two alternatives necessarily entails 
some provisional identifi cation of what kinds of data are relevant and what are not. Th e pro-
cess is slow, incremental, and stepwise, and each step is necessarily selective in scope. But 
every test promises to reveal a fraction more of the big picture. Th e glass-as-good-as-empty 
reaction of the knee-jerk cynic in relation to this kind of work contrasts starkly with the 
glass-perhaps-no-longer-dry reaction of the measured skeptic.
Yet what if the description that motivated the more specifi c questions and hypotheses was 
inadequate, as at least two of my critics seem to suggest? If I had paid more attention to the 
phenomenological experiences, the aff ective properties, and the ‘embodied know-how’ of 
possession would the resulting questions (and answers) look diff erent? Both Espirito Santo 
and Arnaud Halloy criticize a lack of attention to aff ective and experiential dimensions in my 
account (relative to the attention paid to conceptual dimensions). Espirito Santo demands 
a clearer diff erentiation between concepts and embodied know-how, while Halloy suggests 
that an “overly ‘representational’ conception of cognition is prejudicial” when one wishes to 
take into account how a medium’s experience of possession evolves over time. Halloy further 
presents interesting and highly relevant data from his own research with members of another 
Afro-Brazilian religious group in Recife, northeast Brazil that he claims suggest an ‘alterna-
tive framework’ for the analysis.
I agree that the analysis focuses primarily on conceptual underpinnings of possession prac-
tices and the cognitive mechanisms that potentially permit and constrain these concepts. It is 
not clear to me, however, that concepts could or should in fact be separated from ‘embodied 
know-how’ inherent in the practices. On the contrary, people’s physical sensations prior to, 
aft er, and sometimes during possession appeared to be integral to their interpretations—or 
concepts—of what possession entails; that is, of how medium and spirit are integrated during 
a possession episode. Physical movement, physiological arousal, and bodily manipulation 
via such varied practices as eating, drinking, drumming, dancing, singing, healing, and the 
donning of ceremonial apparel are indeed salient components of Afro-Brazilian religious 
life. Careful descriptions and analyses of these elements are potentially indispensable to an 
account that would seek to explain, for example, how a novice medium becomes an expert 
medium. In the accounts developed in Th e Mind Possessed, I endeavor to avoid setting up 
contrasts between aff ects, percepts, and concepts. Th is is, in part, because I do not subscribe 
to the position that human cognition readily cleaves into embodied/experiential stuff  on one 
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side and conceptual stuff  on the other (or, for that matter, innate and cultural stuff ). Rather, I 
take as given that, for example, misfortune (such as illness or poverty) activates negative af-
fect, and I suggest that this might be an important factor contributing to people’s motivations 
to seek out mediumistic services. Without doubt, there are causal factors contributing to 
the global incidence and spread of the spirit possession phenomena under question that are 
absent from my account. Th e challenge I put to my critics is to specify how the incorporation 
of candidate factors, however they are classifi ed or labeled, potentially contribute to enhanc-
ing the explanatory power of that account, or, indeed, to its revision. Better still would be to 
systematically and empirically demonstrate this hypothesized contribution.
Halloy’s ethnographic observations are fascinating and relevant to understanding how 
people conceive of possession. Th is question is at the heart of my research and my ethno-
graphic observations yielded a complex set of problems that ultimately revealed, unsurpris-
ingly, that the answer varies according to whom, how, and the context in which one asks. In 
brief, two principle conceptualizations of possession were present in the community with 
which I worked. One entailed that the spirits eff ectively displaced the hosts from their bod-
ies—an experience that was variously described as taking over, dominating or controlling. 
Th e other entailed a merger between the spirit and the host, such that the possessed indi-
vidual would be represented as neither host nor spirit, but a new, fused person. My observa-
tions of the frequency of use of these concepts led me to propose that the ‘displacement’, or 
take-over, description of possession had a transmission advantage over the merger, or ‘fusion’ 
description. Possession was very rarely described in terms of fusion, and the concept was 
only ever expressed to me by two people. One of these, the cult house leader, presented the 
fusion description to the community as the ‘theologically correct’ account of what is hap-
pening when someone is possessed (adapting a version of this concept also to explain how 
something similar happens across a lifetime of mediumistic episodes). Yet the fusion concept 
appeared to have great diffi  culty sticking. Th e displacement concept, in contrast, prevailed 
despite no explicit or authoritative instruction. Indeed, in more informal contexts, even the 
cult house leader regularly made inferences about the behaviors of possessed mediums that 
strongly suggested that he was reasoning about these possession episodes in terms of dis-
placement, not fusion. In chapter 7 of the book, I discuss further evidence of the advantage of 
displacement over fusion and speculate that these patterns of transmission may be attribut-
able to intuitive biases guiding reasoning about the social world.
Halloy contends that his data suggest an alternative framework for approaching and un-
derstanding these issues, but, intriguingly, there are many parallels between his data and 
mine. Indeed, every straightforwardly ethnographic claim he makes for the Recife group 
equally applies to the Belém group with which I worked—they too talked about gradations 
of arousal and spirit approximations; they described possession as something to be devel-
oped over the life-course, and regularly attended mediumistic ‘development sessions’; they 
distinguished, in principle, between conscious and unconscious possession-trance (though, 
in practice, almost everyone claimed to experience only unconscious trance); some, as I de-
scribed, talked of possession as a fusion between spirit and medium and not as a complete 
spirit ‘take-over’. 
I suspect that the main diff erences between the two communities lie in the incidence, 
spread, and frequency of use of these various ideas. If this is correct, then the issue of how 
environmental and cognitive diff erences contribute to this diff erence is an intriguing, and 
ultimately answerable, empirical question. A systematic comparison across these two com-
munities could shed some valuable light on the matter. Halloy’s use of the word ‘expert’ to de-
scribe the abilities of cult members who accurately perceive and interpret possession in terms 
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of fusion is perhaps revealing. How do new recruits conceptualize possession? How is the 
novice’s interpretation revised, if at all, through possession experiences and/or theological 
discourse and teaching? What does it take to become expert, and what, if any, is the common 
baseline? How consistently do people employ the fusion concept across diff erent contexts 
(e.g., talking about how possession works in the abstract, telling stories about the behavior 
of a particular individual during a possession episode)? Here, lurking in Halloy’s critique, I 
believe, is an ideal opportunity to follow his concluding mandate: to pay attention not just 
to how intuitive thinking constrains cultural practice, but also to how cultural practice may 
transform intuitive thinking. 
Liénard questions my claim that race was not a salient part of everyday Afro-Brazilian reli-
gious life. Certainly, people are not oblivious to the racial variety that characterizes the city in 
which they live. Th ey recognize that, right across the country, varieties of race correlate with 
varieties of status, wealth, education, and even perceptions of beauty. I can only reiterate that 
at the time of my research, race did not appear to be a particularly salient or consequential 
element of Afro-Brazilian religious identity in Belém, for members and nonmembers alike. 
Nevertheless, Liénard poses some thought-provoking questions that I believe could scratch 
below the surface of the everyday discourse upon which I based my assessment. For instance, 
in the book, I describe the value that cult house leaders increasingly place on being able to 
trace authentic African ancestry. Th is is properly conceived of in terms of spiritual ancestry, 
that is according to one’s lineage of initiating fathers and forefathers. It would be particularly 
interesting to explore the possibility that a leader’s perceived spiritual authenticity could be 
strengthened or weakened by cues to racial membership. It is perhaps worth remembering, 
in posing and investigating such questions, that racial variability, and perceptions, salience, 
and implications of racial membership, vary widely across Brazil. Here again is a potentially 
rich opportunity to explore the interplay between stated beliefs and tacit intuitions, and the 
feedback between cognition and environment.
Finally, I can only respectfully acknowledge Liénard’s principal requests for more detailed 
descriptions of diff erent types of possession episodes, for a systematic inquiry into the cri-
teria by which people appraise possession, for systematic comparisons of accounts about 
possession and actual possession episodes, and for a clear assessment of the evolutionary 
implications and consequences of ideas and practices concerning spirits, gods, and other su-
pernatural entities. Th ese are very reasonable requests, but I fear that not even a book-length 
sequel could do them justice. Indeed, despite eighteen months of daily participation in Afro-
Brazilian religious life, and in countless ceremonies, rituals, conversations, and interviews, I 
confess that I am unsure whether my fi eldnotes and transcripts would yield the kind of sys-
tematicity required to answer Liénard’s penetrating questions. Th e criteria by which people 
appraise possession, for example, proved diffi  cult to examine systematically via standard in-
terview, casual conversation, and opportunistic observation. Most of what I gleaned from the 
opportunities that arose appears in the book and subsequent papers. More fundamentally, 
the majority of problems and questions I address in my book surfaced or developed toward 
the end of my fi eldwork period and subsequent to my return from the fi eld. I did not take the 
questions with me to the fi eld, much less the follow-up questions that now arise from these 
initial problems. Since then, however, in a series of papers following the book, I investigate 
these issues further through the systematic collection of data using a range of ethnographic 
and experimental methodologies. 
A conclusion, or ‘last word’, seems inappropriate in light of all that has not been adequately 
discussed. I look forward to further opportunities to continue discussion. Ultimately, I look 
forward to progressing toward answers to the challenging explanatory problems concerning 
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human cultural, and cognitive, recurrence, and variation raised here and in the book. To this 
end, it has been a privilege to meet my three critics; perhaps there are more than three?
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